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This article provides an analytical framework for determining the effects of changes in economic policies and parameters on deforestation. It models dynamic, profitmaximizing land-use choices and obtains unambiguous comparative static results by distinguishing between unmanaged and managed forests. The results suggest that measures to reduce the producer price of logs could be a second-best policy to reduce the pressures on the frontiers of unmanaged forests and to protect biodiversity.
Property rights to forests in frontier areas are rarely established or enforced. As a result of open access, deforestation (the conversion of forested lands to other uses) can be excessive. Even when property rights are established, forested lands provide external benefits that do not accrue to the owner, government forester, or other decisionmaker. These external benefits include stabilization of the regional and global climate, conservation of the soil, prevention of floods, preservation of biodiversity, and gathering of nontimber products by individuals who do not own the forest. These externalities can be another reason for excessive deforestation.
In theory, economic instruments would overcome the market failures that lead to excessive deforestation. Secure property rights could be established and enforced to eliminate the open access problem. External benefits of forests could be internalized by taxes on deforestation or subsidies for the maintenance of forestlands equal in amount to the external benefits. Such first-best policies would lead individuals to make efficient land-use decisions through the operation of market forces. In practice, however, governments rarely use first-best polices such as Pigouvian taxes. Some externalities are international in nature (carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation), and individual countries have no incentive to implement globally efficient policies. Other reasons for the absence of efficient policies are political (for example, the owners of forests have better representation than the beneficiaries of positive forest externalities). In addition, the establishment and enforcement of secure property rights are costly.
In the absence of first-best policies, the size of the welfare loss that arises from market failures in the forest sector is determined by the incentives, prices, and policies faced by those who make decisions about land use. Economic parameters, such as transportation costs, royalty structure, trade policy, foreign exchange policy, and productivity changes in the forest sector as well as in agriculture, influence the patterns of deforestation through their effects on the incentives of those individuals making choices about land use. Therefore, two questions arise in the absence of first-best policies for forest management and land use. First, which policies should be avoided because they would increase the welfare loss arising from excessive deforestation? Second, which second-best policies can be implemented to reduce the welfare loss arising from excessive deforestation?
In many cases, the effects of policies on deforestation are not straightforward. For example, there are conflicting views on whether an increase in log prices leads to an increase or a decrease in deforestation. In one view, lower log prices reduce logging profits and the incentives for logging and hence reduce deforestation. In the opposing view, lower log prices reduce the profitability of forestry and hence encourage the conversion of forestlands to other uses such as agriculture (see Vincent 1990; Brandon and Ramankutty 1993; and Sharma and others 1994) . The effect of changes in log prices has particular relevance for the controversial debate about the effect on deforestation of a ban on log exports or other trade restrictions that lower the domestic price of logs.
This article is related to three strands of the theoretical literature. First, an extensive forestry literature builds on Faustmann (1968 Faustmann ( , originally published in 1849 and examines the effects of changes in various economic parameters on the optimal management of a forest (see Jackson 1980; Chang 1983; Nautiyal and Williams 1990; Hyde and Newman 1991; Thiele 1995; and Thiele and Wiebelt 1994) . Most of these papers use comparative statics analysis to determine the effect of changes in production costs, discount rate, and various taxes on the optimal rotation age and the optimal management intensity for a given forest. These models rarely consider possible changes in land use. Second, static land-use models have been used to analyze the optimal use of land at a given point in time. This work was pioneered by von Thünen (1826), applied to forestry by Ledyard and Moses (1974) , and recently used by Chomitz and Gray (1996) . Third, the effect on land use of changes in the price of logs has been explored in recent work that applies land-use models to deforestation problems (Deacon 1994; Deininger and Minten 1996; Southgate 1990; Kishor and Constantino 1993; Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath 1993; and Barbier and Rauscher 1993) . In addition, several authors have analyzed the empirical relationship between economic parameters and deforestation (see others 1995 and Cropper and Griffiths 1994) . None of these works, however, has produced unambiguous results with regard to the directional impact on deforestation of apparently simple changes, such as a drop in the price of logs.
This article provides an analytical framework for determining the effects of changes in economic policies and parameters on deforestation. The framework allows the systematic analysis and reconciliation of opposing views on the effect on deforestation of changes in the price of logs. A simple theoretical land-use model also provides results on the effects on deforestation of specific policy changes, such as the imposition of a ban on log exports.
Section I outlines the modeling approach. Section II presents a formal model of the comparative statics of land use. Section III discusses tentative policy implications. Section IV concludes with a discussion of extensions and further research.
I. MODELING APPROACH
This article analyzes the links between economic parameters and deforestation through a theoretical model of profit-maximizing choice of land use. Following von Thünen's (1826) approach, it assumes that land is put to the use that maximizes the present value of profits to the decisionmaker. The analysis of land-use dynamics is based on a formal comparative statics model, similar to those in the traditional forestry literature. It differs from previous work by simultaneously incorporating two elements that are critical for understanding deforestation processes: a distinction between different types of forests and the dynamic nature of land-use decisions involving forests.
First, the analysis clearly distinguishes between managed and unmanaged forests. In unmanaged forests, net timber growth is zero because decaying timber offsets biological growth. Logging of such a mature forest can be modeled like the mining of a nonrenewable resource (see Lyon 1981) . Unmanaged forests would include primary forests and mature second-growth forests. Managed forests, such as plantation forests, by contrast, are planted in order to be harvested at regular intervals. Even though the dichotomy of managed and unmanaged forests is somewhat extreme, the distinction not only simplifies the analysis but also clarifies the often opposite impact of a policy on managed and unmanaged forests. Moreover, the distinction is relevant from a policy perspective because unmanaged and managed forests provide different types of environmental externalities. Unmanaged forests typically have higher value for the conservation of biodiversity, while managed forests (depending on the subsequent use of forest products) can provide greater benefit in terms of carbon sequestration.
The second difference from previous work is the analysis of land-use changes in a dynamic context. A static analysis based on a comparison of returns to different land uses at one point in time can be misleading. The relevant question is not only whether deforestation would occur on a given piece of land but also when it would occur. For example, the introduction of forest plantations could increase logging of unmanaged forests in the short run but slow down deforestation in the long run when the plantation output reaches the market. The timing of excessive deforestation is important from a policy point of view because it determines the effectiveness of corrective policies that are taken at a specific point in time. Therefore, the analysis of policy impacts has to be based on the comparison between different land-use patterns through time.
In a dynamic context, land-use decisions depend on not only current log prices but also the expectation about future prices. The analysis assumes certainty and rational expectations. Therefore, agents determine their profit-maximizing behavior in the first period for all times in the future based on the expected path of log prices. In the absence of unanticipated shocks, there is no difference between the expected and realized price path and the expected and realized behavior.
As a result of geographic conditions and anticipated changes in log prices, deforestation rates can increase or decrease over time without a change in policy. Because deforestation rates can change without policy changes, the relevant question for analyzing the effect of policy changes is not whether deforestation rates fall or rise after a change in policy occurs, but whether deforestation rates differ from what they would have been if the change in policy had not occurred. This comparison of the actual with the counterfactual scenario is the natural realm of theoretical modeling. The analysis models a policy change as an unanticipated shock that changes price expectations and, therefore, profit-maximizing behavior. The analysis focuses on the change in behavior that results from such unanticipated policy changes.
II. A FORMAL MODEL OF DYNAMIC LAND USE
This section contains a partial equilibrium model of profit-maximizing land use to determine dynamic land use as a function of an exogenous path of log prices over time. The model analyzes the timing of land-use changes for each specific parcel of land. It derives results for spatial land-use changes by combining the changes in the timing of land-use changes for each class of land (land with the same locational characteristics).
Initially, all land is covered with unmanaged forest. There is no profit to the owner of an unmanaged forest until it is converted. After converting the unmanaged forest, the owner puts the land to its profit-maximizing use, either as managed forest or as farm land. The decision to convert an unmanaged forest depends on the profit or loss at the time of conversion (value of logs-if soldminus clearing or logging costs) and the profits from alternative land use after logging (farming or managed forest). In this model, the value of logs represents all forest products, including latex, fruits, nuts, and fuelwood. The model is equally applicable in cases where (a) the unmanaged forest is logged, the logs are sold, and the land is subsequently cultivated, (b) the unmanaged forest is logged, but the land is left idle after logging, or (c) the removal of logs is not profitable, and the forest is simply cleared for subsequent farming or managed forestry.
After the initial conversion of the unmanaged forest, the owner may switch between different alternative land uses. Of course, on some lands logging might not occur in finite time. The following diagram shows the sequence of possible land uses:
where t u is the time of converting unmanaged forest to managed forest or farming, and t a is the time of switching from managed forest to farming or from farming to managed forest.
Equation 1 defines the present value of profit from profit-maximizing land use, Π ia , in land class i from the time of conversion of unmanaged forest to infinity. Superscript a refers to the profit-maximizing land use-either managed forest or farming-after logging the unmanaged forest. The land class is for a particular parcel of land and represents a generalization of von Thünen-type distance from market, including other location-specific factors such as slope and fertility.
(
where k is a parameter that represents the effect of exogenous policy changes on the log price, π is profit in each period, and s is the time passed after conversion of the unmanaged forest at t u . Superscript u refers to unmanaged forest, and r is the discount rate of the decisionmaker.
Equation 2 defines the land expectation value, LEV, the present value of the sum of conversion profit and subsequent land-use profits.
The model is based on an exogenous log price path. The model, thus, applies to a situation of perfectly elastic demand, that is, for log exports of a small country. For the log price path, the analysis assumes that p t > 0 and that (p tt / p t ) < r. (Here and throughout subscripts denote partial derivatives.) This assumption appears eminently reasonable given that (p tt / p t ) < r is satisfied for any constant rate of price increase less than the discount rate, r. The assumption is also consistent with empirical observation and with the results from theoretical models of nonrenewable resource extraction (logs from unmanaged forests) with increasing extraction costs and a renewable back-stop technology (logs from managed forests) that would make log prices rise at a declining rate. Market simulations support the price path assumptions (see section IV).
The effect of policy interventions that would depress log prices is expressed in the form of a parameter k that enters the log price with the following characteristics: p k < 0 and (p tk / p k ) < r. An increase in k either reduces the level of the log price path or reduces the price at any time in some other form; however, an increase in k does not reduce the slope of the price path more than permitted by (p tk / p k ) < r. With profit functions increasing in log prices, the profit from both conversion and subsequent cultivation will decline with a drop in log prices, resulting in the following properties:
The Remaining Unmanaged Forests
How do changes in the log price path affect the area of unmanaged forests that will ultimately remain? The unmanaged forest will never be converted in any class of land in which the LEV is less than zero for any finite time of conversion. By contrast, all land will ultimately be converted in classes of land in which the LEV is greater than zero at least at some time. With these properties, LEV decreases, for all t u , with a drop in the log price path, k. With a lower log price path, there is no land class in which unmanaged forest that is ultimately converted would not also have been converted with higher prices. However, some classes of land that would ultimately be converted under a higher log price path may not be converted at all under lower prices. Hence, the unmanaged forest area that will ultimately be converted is equal or less under a lower log price path.
Up to this point, the model is general enough for the results to hold independent of the property rights regime and the specific production functions discussed in the following sections. It also applies for a Faustman-type rotation model for managed forests in which forest intensity and rotation period are chosen to maximize the LEV.
Conversion of Unmanaged Forests with Secure Property Rights
The next step is to analyze how economic parameters affect land use during the time of transition from all-unmanaged forest to the final land use. To provide stylized answers to this question, this section assumes very simple production functions. The analysis is carried out first for the case of secure property rights and then for the case of open access.
Under secure property rights, conversion profits and profits from subsequent cultivation accrue to the owner or decisionmaker. Even under secure property rights, externalities occur in the form of nontimber benefits of the forests that do not accrue to the landowner, such as climatic and soil stabilization, biodiversity conservation, and nontimber forest products. The case of secure property rights is also applicable where logging decisions are made by a government that cares about logging revenues but ignores nontimber benefits of the forest. Such gov-ernment behavior appears reasonable for a variety of reasons. In contrast to nontimber benefits, logging often generates government revenues from stumpage fees. Some nontimber benefits such as climate and soil stabilization will accrue in the future, possibly after the tenure of the current government. A concentrated logging industry can generate lobbying pressure on the government more easily than the less-organized recipients of nontimber benefits can. Finally, some nontimber benefits may accrue as international externalities.
Under secure property rights, the owner of each piece of unmanaged forestland maximizes the LEV by choosing the optimal time for converting the unmanaged forest, the optimal subsequent land use, and possibly the optimal time for switching later from managed forest to farming or from farming to managed forest. For simplicity, the analysis uses Leontief (constant coefficient) technology for the production of logs. In real-life forestry, there is clearly some substitutability between timber land and effort. Different logging intensities and technologies can be observed in logging operations throughout the world. Detailed analysis shows that the main result of this section-conversion of unmanaged forests proceeds less rapidly with lower log prices-continues to hold under very reasonable conditions even with variable logging effort (von Amsberg 1994).
The two inputs to production are unmanaged forestland and logging effort (with effort representing all inputs other than land, for example labor and capital such as chainsaws). The profit from converting unmanaged forest is
, where l iu is the quantity of logs that can be sold once at the time of converting (logging) one unit of land of unmanaged forests in land class i, and c iu is the cost of converting one unit of land of unmanaged forest in land class i and transporting logs to the market.
For simplicity it is assumed that a managed forest produces a constant timber crop. The model abstracts from the question of optimal effort and optimal rotation periods in the managed forest and focuses squarely on the question of land conversion. The profit from a managed forest is
, where l im is the quantity of logs that can be produced each period by cultivating one unit of land in land class i with managed forest, c im is the cost each period of cultivating one unit of land in land class i with managed forest and transporting logs to the market, and d is the fixed rotation period until the harvest of a managed forest.
Land that is left idle after logging yields zero profits. Profits from farming are assumed to be independent of p, c u , c m , and r. The profits from profitmaximizing land use after converting unmanaged forest are assumed to be nondeclining.
1 With these assumptions, the following properties result: π u t > 0, 1. The assumption about nondeclining profits refers to the time of logging, t u , and not to the time passed since land conversion, s. For simplicity, the model does not allow for profits to depend on s. Even though not shown formally, the basic intuition of this model would not change if profits were declining in s as long as the present value of future alternative land uses at the time of conversion would be nondeclining in t u . With this extension, the basic results would carry through also in the cases of shifting or nutrient-mining agriculture where agricultural profits would typically decline in s (but not in t u ). Land use after the logging of unmanaged forest is determined by maximizing profits by choice of land use over time (managed forest or farming). The optimal time of logging the unmanaged forest is determined by maximizing the present value of returns from logging and subsequent profit-maximizing cultivation (s is the integration variable, running from the time of logging, t u , to infinity): 
where an asterisk denotes the LEV-maximizing conversion time. The intuition of this first-order condition is that at the optimal time of conversion, the rate of appreciation of logs in the unmanaged forest, due to the increasing log price, must equal the forgone returns from logging as well as alternative cultivation of the land. The effect of changes in the parameters on the optimal time of conversion, t u* , is determined by solving the total derivatives of equation 4 with respect to k, c u , and r for (dt u* / dk), (dt u* / dc u ), and (dt u* / dr), respectively: Hence, on any piece of land, a reduction in the log price path (an increase in k) delays the profit-maximizing logging time. An increase in the cost of logging also delays logging. If profits from logging are positive and greater than the reduction in profits from land cultivation with an increase in the discount rate, then an increase in the discount rate advances deforestation.
Conversion of Unmanaged Forests with Open Access
Unmanaged forests typically involve frontier situations with poorly defined property rights and some form of open access. Angelsen (1996) , Schneider (1995) , Mendelsohn (1994) , Mahar (1989) , Anderson and Hill (1990) , and Binswanger (1989) have modeled such situations of frontier land use and land races. In these models, property rights are granted only for colonists who invest resources (which typically means that they clear the land). Such a policy regime has been analyzed in the case of Brazil but is common in other countries as well. Mendelsohn (1994) shows that development (or conversion of unmanaged forest) will occur wherever the value of land is positive; however the rents of land with values above zero will be at least partially dissipated through the investments necessary to establish property rights. The following modification to the basic model analyzes how changes in log prices affect unmanaged forest conversion under this particular policy regime.
If access to the unmanaged forest is open and property rights are acquired by clearing and cultivating land, conversion does not take place at the profitmaximizing time but as soon as the sum of profit or loss from conversion and the present value of profits from subsequent cultivation rises to zero. All lands with positive conversion profits would already have been converted in the past. The condition that determines the time of conversion is thus:
.
The comparative statics results can be formally derived, similar to the case of secure property rights. For the open access case, the algebra is tedious, but the results are rather obvious. Therefore, the formal derivation of the following comparative statics result is not shown here:
Under open access, a drop in the log price path delays the logging time, as in the case of secure property rights. This is intuitively obvious by observing that LEV in equation 6 is increasing in t u and decreasing in k (π 
The Switch between Managed Forests and Agriculture
After unmanaged forest has been converted, the land will be put to the profitmaximizing use, which may be farming or managed forest. If there is a change in the relative profitability of these activities, there may be a later switch from one to the other. If there is a switch, the optimal time of the switch from managed forest to agriculture (t a* ), or from agriculture to managed forest, is determined by the condition of equal profits in both land uses: These results simply show that the switch from farming to managed forests, if it occurs, is delayed by factors that reduce the profits from managed forests (a drop in the log price path, an increase in the cost of managed forests, or an increase in the discount rate). A switch from managed forests to farming, if it occurs, is advanced by the same factors.
Land-Use Changes
The analysis has produced unambiguous results on the timing of land conversion for any land class i. Because this analysis is valid for any land class, it implies results for aggregate land-use changes over time. A drop in the log price path delays the possible conversion of unmanaged forest to other uses (including managed forests), delays the possible switch from farming to managed forest, and advances the possible switch from managed forest to farming, all for any land class i. Therefore, at any time after the drop in the log price path, there will be more or equal land under unmanaged forests and less or equal land under managed forest than if the price drop had not occurred. The effect on the aggregate area of agriculture is ambiguous.
A drop in the log price path reduces the conversion of unmanaged forests and, thus, retains a larger area of unmanaged forests. At the same time, however, a lower log price path reduces the area under managed forests. Keeping in mind the distinction between unmanaged and managed forests, the intuition of the main result is easily explained. The conflicting views about the effects of log price changes on deforestation arise from the dual nature of forestland as storage for logs and as an input to the production of logs. This article reconciles the two opposing views by analyzing the distinct impacts of changes in the price of logs on different types of forests, which are characterized by the difference in the importance of land as storage for logs or as an input to log production. A higher log price path increases the logging of unmanaged forests that are used to store logs but that are no longer productive. With a higher log price path, the logging of more remote, unmanaged forests with higher site-specific extraction costs becomes profitable, and the logging of unmanaged forests increases. By contrast, managed forestlands are productive. A higher log price path increases the profitability of log production and results in more land being devoted to log production. Therefore a higher log price path leads to a smaller area of unmanaged forest and a larger area of managed forest.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the translation of results for the timing of conversion of a specific land class to results for aggregate land use over time. The landuse graph in figure 1 shows different land classes on the vertical axis, with higher land classes representing increasingly unfavorable conditions for cultivation, for example increasing transport costs in a von Thünen-type model. The horizontal axis represents time beginning with a situation in which all land is covered with unmanaged forest. In good locations (near the horizontal axis), agriculture is relatively more profitable than forestry. Conversion of unmanaged forest would begin at these most favorable locations and, as the price rises along the log price path, proceed to less favorable locations. At sufficiently high log prices, managed forestry becomes profitable as shown in the example in figure 1. Once the log price stabilizes, no further conversion of unmanaged forests occurs. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a drop in the log price path (an increase in k). For each land class, the conversion of unmanaged forests-if it occurs-is delayed (compared with the dark line that represents the base case), the switch from agriculture to managed forests-if it occurs-is delayed, and the switch from managed forestry to agriculture-if it occurs-is advanced. As a result of these changes in the timing of conversion of specific land classes, there are changes in aggregate land use at any specific time. An unanticipated drop in the log price path leads to an increase in the area under unmanaged forests and a reduction in the area under managed forest at any time after the shock. Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis. It compares aggregate land use at any time after a hypothetical shock with a situation in which the shock would not have occurred. Additional results, not all analytically derived here, include the following (see von Amsberg 1994).
• An increase in conversion (logging) costs for unmanaged forests (or a logging fee per unit of unmanaged forest) produces an increase in unmanaged forests and a decrease in managed forests and farming area. • An increase in the decisionmakers' discount rate produces a reduction in unmanaged forest if logging is relatively profitable (see equation 5) and an increase in the area of unmanaged forest otherwise.
• An increase in farming profits produces a reduction in the area of both unmanaged and managed forests and an increase in the area of farming.
• A reforestation subsidy per unit of land produces a reduction in the areas of unmanaged forests and farming and an increase in the area of managed forests.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In a very simple land-use model, a drop in the log price path leads to a delay in the conversion of unmanaged forests in all land classes. The quantity of unmanaged forests that is ultimately preserved is the same or larger under a lower log price path. The area of managed forests is reduced under a lower log price path. Great care needs to be taken in applying the results of a simple theoretical model directly to complex real-life policy situations. However, the main result of the basic model and its underlying basic intuition appear to be robust enough to suggest some implications for the policy debate on timber trade restrictions, agricultural intensification, and changes in the cost of capital. 
Timber Trade Restrictions
Many timber-exporting countries have imposed log export bans (LEBs) or high log export taxes (see Crossley 1993) . LEBs were imposed primarily with the objective of promoting domestic processing and the export of higher-valued sawnwood or manufactured goods. Even though LEBs were conceived as instruments for the protection of infant industry, they have implications for logging rates, and a lively debate centers on the environmental effects of LEBs (see Goodland and Daly 1994) . LEBs, most other timber trade restrictions, as well as consumer boycotts in importing countries lower the price of logs in the exporting country. Following a log export ban in Costa Rica, for example, domestic log prices have fallen to 20-60 percent of international price levels (Kishor and Constantino 1993) .
This article suggests a differentiated approach to analyzing whether lower log prices increase or decrease deforestation. A lower log price path would tend to reduce the logging of unmanaged forests but, at the same time, would also tend to reduce the area of managed forests. At any time, there would be more unmanaged forest and less managed forest than otherwise.
2 This result is consistent with earlier findings that lower domestic log prices encourage wasteful logging and processing techniques (Repetto and Gillis 1988) . In contrast to Repetto and Gillis (1988), however, this article suggests that the reduced logging intensity resulting from a lower log price path would go along with reduced logging (and larger remaining areas) of unmanaged forests and reduced areas of managed forests.
Policies other than LEBs that reduce log prices include import restrictions by log-importing countries and consumer boycotts of tropical timber. Such policies would tend to reduce the pressure for logging unmanaged forests and therefore assist the conservation of biodiversity and other external benefits associated with unmanaged forests. The same measures would lead to reduced incentives for managed forestry and a decline in the area devoted to managed forests. Thus these policies have positive effects on the external benefits associated with unmanaged (old-growth) forests and negative effects on the external benefits associated with managed (plantation) forests. Because the effect on the combined area of managed and unmanaged forests is ambiguous, no statement can be made about the effect on external benefits that are associated with both types of forests. However, FAO (1992) estimated that 82 percent of the tropical forest area logged between 1981 and 1990 was in previously unlogged (unmanaged) forests. This figure would suggest the relative importance of the positive effect of lower log prices on unmanaged forest conservation compared with the negative effect of reduced managed forests.
2. If protection is declining over time or the domestic processing industry gains some efficiency over time, the price depressing effect of an LEB would decline over time. The effect is thus well represented by the model, with an increase in k with p k < 0 and (p tk / p k ) < r.
The positive effect of LEBs on unmanaged forests should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement or a recommendation for LEBs. First, the effects of real-life LEBs include political economy effects that are not captured by the simple model presented here. Second, due to reduced logging and processing efficiency and increased logging wastes, LEBs and other trade restrictions are clearly inferior to first-best policies (for example, a charge for the conversion of forestland equal to the external benefits of unmanaged forests). Even in the context of the simple model presented in this article, LEBs can be justified as second-best policy instruments only if first-best instruments are impossible to implement and if the benefits of reduced logging outweigh the efficiency costs imposed on the economy as a result of the price distortions from trade restrictions. In policy terms, removing LEBs in the absence of efficient first-best policies for protecting forests will increase the pressure on unmanaged forests.
Other Policies
Policymakers sometimes claim that agricultural intensification programs as well as forest plantation projects reduce the pressures to convert unmanaged forests. Within the conceptual framework presented here, agricultural improvements, such as increased yields from improved seed varieties or improved farming practices, would reduce pressures on forests only if they reduce the potential profitability of agriculture on currently forested lands. This would occur only if the demand for the agricultural product is very inelastic (for example, in the case of subsistence agriculture). Agricultural improvements would then reduce the prices of agricultural outputs and, thus, the profitability of agriculture. In this case, the same quantity of agricultural output would be produced on a smaller area of land, and pressures for deforestation would be reduced (for the subsistence case, see Angelsen 1996) .
By contrast, if demand for the agricultural product is elastic (for example, in the case of an export crop), agricultural improvements would increase the potential profitability of agriculture on currently forested lands. The area of agriculture would expand at the expense of managed and unmanaged forests, and agricultural progress would unambiguously increase deforestation. If agricultural intensification does not change the potential profitability of agriculture on currently forested lands (for example, because irrigation systems are installed in currently cultivated areas only), there would be no effect on forestry.
Several other policies increase producer prices and, thus, lead to increased productivity of land use in either agriculture or managed forestry. In the case of export goods, devaluation of the national currency increases the profitability of agriculture, managed forestry, and logging of unmanaged forests. Devaluation therefore contributes to increased conversion of unmanaged forests. Road building increases the producer prices paid to farmers and foresters, particularly in more remote and, therefore, often unmanaged forest areas. Road building is particularly harmful to the conservation of unmanaged forests, increasing the profitability not only of alternative cultivation but also of logging itself (see also Chomitz and Gray 1996) . Although higher producer prices reduce logging waste, they also go along with more logging of unmanaged forests.
Measures that reduce decisionmakers' discount rates include improved access to credit and more secure tenure. Lower discount rates unambiguously increase the area of managed forests because they reduce the cost of waiting for trees to mature. The effect on unmanaged forests at the agricultural margin depends on the profitability of logging. If logging is profitable by itself (logs are typically sold in the market), a lower discount rate slows the logging of unmanaged forests because it reduces the opportunity cost of leaving the timber standing in the forest. If logging is not profitable by itself (logs typically are not sold but are burnt), land clearing is an investment that has costs (labor, equipment) and is made for obtaining the benefits of alternative land use. A lower discount rate stimulates this investment and advances the logging of unmanaged forests. The latter situation is reported for parts of the Brazilian Amazon (see Schneider 1993) . Empirical evidence that the availability of credit advances deforestation is also provided by Ozório de Alameida and Campari (1995), Barbier and Burgess (1996) , Pfaff (1997) , and Andersen (1997) . At the frontier between unmanaged and managed forests, a lower discount rate can also lead to increased conversion if the higher returns to plantation forestry outweigh the reduction in opportunity costs of the standing unmanaged forests. Kishor and Constantino (1993) makes this point in a static context.
IV. EXTENSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This article suggests a new conceptual approach to the analysis of economic determinants of forestland use. However, the model has limitations that reduce its direct applicability to policymaking situations.
One limitation of the model is the assumption of an exogenous log price path and, hence, the assumption that log output does not influence log prices. von Amsberg (1994) contains a simulation model with the same structure underlying the model, but with an endogenous log price path. The simulation model determines the profit-maximizing land use and profit-maximizing forestry effort for a finite number of land classes (representing lands with differing transportation costs) for a finite number of time periods assuming that all land is covered with unmanaged forests in the first period. The analysis compares the supply of logs that results from these land-use choices with the demand for logs for the same price at different levels of demand elasticity. The model is rerun until a log price path is found at which the log market clears in all periods.
This simulation model allows analysis of dynamic land use in a situation in which log prices respond to supply. Such a situation would be expected, for example, for a local fuelwood market or for a large log-exporting country. The simulations also illustrate the theoretical results of the basic model and could be used together with location-specific data to estimate deforestation effects empirically in specific real-life policy situations. In all simulations, the resulting equilibrium price path for logs shows the characteristic of declining rates of increase, consistent with the assumptions of the basic model with exogenous log prices. The simulations produce seven major results that are consistent with the theoretical results derived here.
First, a tax on log sales (simulated by having the market clear for consumer prices that are equal to producer prices plus tax) leads to a reduction in the producer price compared to the base case. Consistent with the results of the analysis with the basic model, the reduced producer price path leads to a reduction in logging of unmanaged forests and a decrease in the area with managed forests. The area with unmanaged forests increases, while the area with managed forests decreases. Agriculture contracts at the margin with unmanaged forests and expands at the margin with managed forests. Figure 2 shows the results of this simulation and the comparison with the base case.
Second, a charge levied per area of unmanaged forests logged (like a Pigouvian tax for the reduction of external benefits from the standing natural forest) leads to a reduction in logging of unmanaged forests. This reduction in logging leads to a reduction in managed forests at the extensive margin. Log prices are somewhat higher than in the base case, and the margin between agriculture and managed forests shifts in favor of managed forests.
Third, a reduction in transportation costs (for example, as the result of road improvements) leads to increased pressure on the frontier and an expansion of agriculture and managed forest at the expense of unmanaged forests. The effect of road building on the log price path and logging intensity is ambiguous because the reduction in transportation unit costs and the increase in distance due to increased logging operate in opposite directions.
Fourth, an increase in agricultural productivity for a product with infinitely elastic demand (for example, exports of a cash crop from a small country) lead to an increase in agricultural area. The resulting increase in the log price path shifts the area of managed forests into the area of unmanaged forests, which decline. At the other extreme, an increase in agricultural productivity for a product with inelastic demand (for example, a pure subsistence crop) leads to a decline in the agricultural area, a fall in log prices, and a reduction in the logging of unmanaged forests.
Fifth, if demand for logs is highly elastic (the case of small timber-exporting countries), an increase in the productivity of managed forestry creates additional pressures to convert unmanaged forests. However, if demand for logs is inelastic (for example, where timber supplies fuelwood for the local market), increased supply of logs from plantations reduces the price of logs and, thus, reduces the pressure to convert unmanaged forests. As in the case of agriculture, demand for logs in a real-life situation is neither fully elastic nor fully inelastic. The resulting net effect from the introduction of plantations is ambiguous and depends on case-specific demand elasticities. In certain cases, the increase in productivity of managed forests increases the logging of unmanaged forests in the short run because of the additional demand for managed forestland. In the long run, however, as production from managed forests enters the market, logging of unmanaged forests is reduced. In the theoretical case of total absence of managed forestry, logs are a nonrenewable resource with increasing extraction costs. In this case, the price path shows an increasing rate of price increase.
Sixth, an increase in the decisionmaker's discount rate (for example, as a result of a reduced time horizon or more uncertain tenure) leads to an expansion of agriculture into managed forest areas because log prices are lower and the returns to forestry are better than the returns to agriculture due to the longer growth period for trees. However, logging of unmanaged forests increases only slightly if timber rents at the margin of unmanaged forests are relatively low or even negative. In these cases, clearing land is an investment that is less profitable with a higher discount rate. Increasing security of tenure alone does not drastically reduce deforestation.
Seventh, open access to the unmanaged forests drastically advances logging. In the long run, however, the remaining unmanaged forest area is the same with open access and secure property rights because in both cases all lands with positive conversion profits are ultimately logged. Under open access, the log price is initially lower (because of excessive supply from still abundant forests), later higher (because excessive logging leads to higher transportation costs), and finally equal to the case of secure property rights.
Important additional research in three areas would strengthen the analysis. First, many of the parameter values that are used in the simulations could be estimated empirically for specific locations, as is done for a related model for the case of Belize by Chomitz and Gray (1996) . This would allow quantitative predictions to be derived for specific policy interventions. Second, a model of a forest as a stock of homogenous timber is clearly unrealistic. In particular, unmanaged forests consist of a variety of tree species with highly different economic values. Even though some of the qualitative effects of this heterogeneity of timber are captured in the production function for logs employed in this article, a modeling approach closer to the physical realities of a natural forest would be desirable but would require additional empirical work. Finally, important economies of scale in land use, both internal (for example, lumpy investments necessary for forestry and agriculture) and external (for example, minimum area for biodiversity conservation), are not addressed in the current model.
